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"A SELECTION OF CAFS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE. ESPECIAL-Y FiRE, LIFE,
ACCIDENT, MARINE AND E.MPLOYER'S LIABILITy', WITH AN ArPPEDIx OF.-
FoRMs," EC. By George Richards, M. A., of the New York Bar, formerly
lecturer oil Insurance law in tile School of Law of Columbia University'
and the New York Law School. New York: The Banks Law Pub.
CO. -.. 38D.
In this case book Mr. Richards has followed the same arrangement of
subjects as in his textbook "A Treatise on the Law of Insurance" (3rd ed.).
The two volumes supplement each other. Mr. Richards has succeeded in
condensing within a small space a collection of cases and footnotes which
deal with many important questions of insurance law. The book is divided
into two parts. Part I consists of cases illustrating certain general principles
of insurance law; Part II of cases illustrating the meaning and effect of
certain clauses commonly found in policies of insurance. This seems to be
a practical and effective scheme of division, and part II should be f6und
particularly useful. As the basis of the chapters in this part, the author
has inserted the New York Standard Fire policy, and typical life, accident
and marine policy forms. Mr. Richards states in the preface to his textbook
referred to above that "The law of insurance is composed of upwards of
3oooo reported cases in the English language, to -which must be added a
'great body of statutory law." In a casebook of reasonable size, it is
obviously impossible to do more than cover this large field in a general
way. The choice of topics and the selection of cases seem to have been
wisely made. When a conflict of authorities exists upon any point, a case
is given on each side of the question. The footnotes by the author have
been prepared with more than ordinary care, and contain upwards of 12oo
citations supplementing the cases printed in tile text. Mr. Richards has"
departed from the type of casebook criticised in the preface to his textbook.
in which "index, table of contents and syllabus were deliberately eliminated."
With a table of contents, footnotes and other means, the material is pre-
sented in a coherent and readily comprehensible form.
B. F. P.
"The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions," by Walter
Fairleigh Dodd, sometime Henry E. Johnston Scho!ar, in the Johns Hopkins
University. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 19jo.
As there has been no general revision of the Pennsylvania Constitution
for thirty-seven years. and amendments have been adopted only twice during
that period, all of them in regard to a single subject, viz., elections; and
as the prescribed method of amendment, though slow, is extremely
simple; even those of us who have taken part in securing these amendments
might be pardoned for opening this book with a feeling of wonder as to
how the material- on the subject could justify a treatise of .292 pages.
especially as Mr. Dodd is by no means alone in the field. His treatment of
the subject, however, dealing both with its history and with the legal
principles which underlie, or should underlie, the decisions of the. courts in
regard to it-principles hs to which there is a great temptation to theorize,
here. for tile most part, wisely withstood-seems to amply justify the publi-
cation. His discussions are interesting, though the form of the book would
have been improved by a division into a number of chapters of convenient
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length, instead of five only. one of which occupies half the total number of
pages, excliding the appendix.
AV'hen, in 1776, independence necessitated some change in the franie of
government of the several colonies, the. legislatures of New Jersey, Virginia
and South Carolina adopted constitutions of their own .motion, wvithout any
kind- of submission to the people, and those of Connecticut and Rhode
Island did practically the same thing, simply voting to Continue their
royal charters in effect, niutalis iniutandis. In New Hampshire, New York,
Delaware and Georgia, the legislatures received special authority to.frame
constitutions, but did not submit their work for adoption by the people, the
latter step being taken only in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland and
North Carolina, in all of which it could probably have been omitted without
serious disapproval. In view of all this, one can readily understand the
slow development of the idea of a fundamental law. adopted by the people
themselves, and changed by their action only, as distinguished from ordinary
legislation.
At first the binding force of a constitution upon a state legislature was
only moral, and the New Jersey constitution of z776 sought to strenkthen-
it by requiring the members of the legislature to.swear not to.annul or
repeal certain specified parts of that instrument. The first Pennsylvania con-
stitution required the people to elect every seven years a council of censors.
to enquire whether the legislature had exercisd unconstitutional powers, and
to recommend the repeal of statutes which the censors thought unconstitu-
tional. Some of the other early constitutions also contained provisions
looking to revision at other hands than 'those of the legislature.. Undoubtedly
the decision in Harburv v. Madison (i Cranch 137), in 18o3, though made
in regard to Congress only, must have operated to destroy the idea that a
state legislature could change a constitution, but Mr. Dodd does not mention
that case, and in fact glides rather hastily over this part of his subject. -
It has never been positively decided whether a legislature, in providing
for a constitutional convention, can limit its authority in any way. Judge
Jameson, in "Constitutional Conventions," contends that it can, but Mr. Dodd
takes the opposite view, which was that of the New York and. Michigan
conventions of i894 and i9o8 respectively, though other conventions have
been more subservient. The Pennsylvania Act of II April, 1872 (P. L 53),
undertook not only to regulate the mode in which the constitution should be
submitted to popular vote, but also to forbid the convention to change the
constitution in certain respects. These restrictions were to some extent
disregarded, and WVells v. Bain (75 Pa. 39) upheld the legislature as to the
mode of submission, but H'oods' App. (id. 59) held that the adoption of the
constitution by popular vote prevented any-decision on the other point, though
the dicta were strongly in favor of the legislature's power.
The constitutions of Pennsylvania and some other states contain no
provisions for revision by a convention, but this does not prevent revision
by that means. Of the constitutions which contain such provisions, only
seventeen specifically require adoption by popular vote. In a few of the
other states, recent conventions have promulgated the constitutions without
any submission, and Miller v. Johnsons (92 Ky. 589) and Taylor v. Comnth.
(sol Va. 829) held that as the people and all branches of the government
had acted under a constitution so promulgated, its validity could no longer be
questioned.
The requirement that the legislature shall approve constitutional amend-
ments at two successive sessions originated when legislatures were per-
mitted to amend constitutions, the re-election of members who had approved
the amendments being regarded as a popular ratification of their action.
The modern practice of requiring all amendments to be adopted by popular
vote amply fulfills the purpose of this ratificati0n, so that the requirement
of a second passage by the legislature is no longer necessary, unless mere
delay be thought desirable.
It would have been interesting if Mr. Dodd had considered the results of
a conflict between amendments which the people have adopted and the
unamended parts of the Constitution. The failure to adopt one of the
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amendments recently proposed in 'this 'state has produced this situation,
which the courts will probably be called upon to deal with. The book was
evidently'written, however, before the vote in 190..B
RuimiEs BY SELEzTED CASES Aqx.oTAmD. Samuel F. Mordecai and Atwell C.
McIntosh. xgio. Durham, North Carolina.
The many-sidedness of the law is at once the delight and despair of
those who pursue its study, but in the case of those concerned in plans for
its logical arrangement, despair will frequently predominate. Substantive and
adjective law seem inextricably entangled. If, then, Professors Mordecai
and McIntosh have included in their casebook on remedies much that is
purely substantive law, who will be bold enough to point to the precise spot
where the line. must be drawn? Surely no one, unless, perhaps, a colleague
whose course is overlapped and whose thunder, incidentally, is stolen.
No one, however, who has grappled with the problem of teaching pro-
cedure will fail to admire the industry and scholarship that has produced
this volume of nearly a thousand pages, covering all branches of remedial
law, with and without judicial proceedings. In the .selection of cases, a
decided preference is given to decisions of the North Carolina courts, but,
if this detracts somewhat from the value of the work for general use, it
ought to add to its popularity in the favored jurisdiction. In treating the
cases themselves, the facts are abridged to very concise digests, a method
which casebook writers have found wise and nectssary in complicated
cases involving many points, but which, if universally adopted, deprives the
cases so treated of part of their educational value. Indeed, one of the pur-
poses of the case system of instruction, as distinguished from the didactic
lecture system, is to teach the student how to analyze the facts of real litigated
disputes and thus get to the heart of the issues involved.
A feature of merit in the work is the introduction, an encydopwdic sum-
mary of the principles illustrated by the leading cases, which, if read in
review, will enable the student to get a general view of the subject, often
a matter of difficulty, unless the reading is under careful direction. -And if
the student reads and retains all that will be found in this volume he should
be well equipped to deal with procedural problems. W. H. L
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS Or THE LAwYER. Gleason I. Archer, Dean of the Suf-
folk School of Law. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. igo.
The subject of legal ethics has become of recognized importance in
recent years, and Mr. Archer has prepared an excellent work. It deals thor-
oughly with the ethical problems which confront the lawyer in the perform-
ance of his duties to his clients, the adverse party, other lawyers, the court,
and the state. The author presents the problem and his solution in a clear
and concise form, and while the reader may in some cases disagree with his
conclusion, he has had the betiefit of an able discussion to assist him in
arriving at his own solution.
Although the book is of value to any lawyer, "it is particularly so to the
young lawyer who is just entering the profession. Indeed, the author seems
to have intended the work primarily for the young lawyer. In the second
chapter he discusses and gives advice upon such matters as the location of
an office, the advisability of taking a clerkship in another's office or start-
ing out in independent practice, and the general condition in which an office
should be kept. Later in the book a chapter is devoted to a discussion of the
desirability of entering into politics. There is also an excellent chapter on
fees, and a schedule of fees is given in the appendix.
The book is based on the canons of ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association and Hoffman's Resolutions.
R. C. H.
